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a b s t r a c t
A system-theoretic approach to cooperation, interaction and allocation is presented that
simplifies, unifies and extends the results on classical cooperative games and their
generalizations. In particular, a general Weber theory of linear values is obtained and a
new theory for local cooperation and general interaction indices is established. The model
is dynamic and based on the notion of states of cooperation that change under actions
of agents. Careful distinction between ‘‘local’’ states of cooperation and general ‘‘system’’
states leads to a notion of entropy for arbitrary non-negative and efficient allocations
and thus to a new information-theoretic criterion for fairness of allocation mechanisms.
Shapley allocations, for instance, are exhibited as arising from randomwalkswithmaximal
entropy. For a large class of cooperation systems, a characterization of game symmetries in
terms of λ-values is given. A concept for cores and Weber sets is proposed and it is shown
that a Weber set of a game with selection structure always contains the core.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The notions of cooperation, allocation and interaction of agents in specified environments have an intuitively dynamic
flavor. Mathematical models for their analysis, however, are often surprisingly static and based on set-theoretic frameworks
where the formation of coalitions and allocations is described as the solution of discrete optimization problemswith respect
to given numerical parameters. The complexity of the model is thus seen mainly as the computational complexity of the
resulting optimization problem. For example, an important part of current research in mechanism design contrasts the
aspirations and the self-interest of individual agents with the common interest and investigates the algorithmic solution of
the resulting optimization problem (see, e.g., [12,30,32]). While these and other problems of computational complexity are
nontrivial and interesting also from a game-theoretic perspective (see, e.g., [14,15,18]), they reflect only a part of the picture.
The classical model of cooperative games assumes that arbitrary subsets of agents can join to form feasible coalitions
and create values in a given economic context. A fundamental model for the so-called probabilistic values that include
the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, etc. was developed for the classical model by Weber [38]. The assumption of
unrestricted cooperation, however, does not always appear justified. Already the communication games of Myerson [31]
exhibit restricted cooperation. The model of Kalai and Samet [24] is built on Aumann’s games with block structure, where
certain critical coalitions partition the set of agents. Hsiao and Raghavan [23] allow a player to choose participation in a
game at various ‘‘action levels’’. The latter can be viewed as a cooperative game where the agents have to observe certain
precedence constraints [16,17,11,20]. Recently, Bilbao et al. have studied models for cooperative games with underlying
combinatorial coalition structures (cf. [3]) such as convex geometries [7,5,6,13], antimatroids [2] or matroids [4]. While
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the feasible coalitions in these models form lattices of sets, Lange and Grabisch [28] introduce a framework where the
family of feasible coalitions is just assumed to enjoy a certain regularity condition. In all these generalizations, analogues of
Shapley’s [35] classical value (and possibly also the core) are sought.
Our present research wants to take a first step towards viewing cooperation, allocation and interaction as dynamic
processes and thus to approach cooperative games system theoretically. We feel encouraged by the result as it appears to
render the structural analysis both simpler and considerablymore general. Not only are all the above-mentioned generalized
models for cooperation and interaction easily identified as special cases but also the classical results can be shown to
extend to this wider context. The dynamic model furthermore suggests to study the entropy of a system of cooperation
and relate it to fair allocations, which seems to offer a promising path of future research. The key to our analysis is a careful
distinction between internal states of cooperation and general states of the system as a whole. The former states model
evolving cooperation while the latter capture the likelihood of certain cooperation instances.
We introduce cooperation systems in Section 2 and review some basic properties. Section 3 discusses cooperative games
in this framework and shows how the previous models fit into it. In Section 4, we develop a theory of efficient linear
allocations and values and relate them to the notion of entropy of system states via natural randomwalks on the cooperation
states. The Shapley allocation turns out to be characterized by having maximal entropy. Moreover, we extend Carreras
and Owen’s [9] classical characterization of game symmetries in terms of the weighted Shapley values to a large class of
cooperation systems that includes, for example, all the above-mentioned models (Theorem 4.5).
Interaction among agents is an important aspect of cooperative game theory that has received considerable attention
from various researchers (cf. [33,21,27,19]). We develop a new theory of general cooperation values and show in Section 5.2
how a general theory of interaction indices arises from it naturally. In the final Section 6, we introduce a model for the
core and Weber sets in cooperation systems that arise from ranking models and establish the corresponding extension of
Weber’s [38] theorem.
2. Cooperation systems
A cooperation system is a quadrupleΓ = (N, V , A,A), whereN is a finite set of agents, V a finite set of states of cooperation
and A a finite set of feasible transitions x → y between states, whichwe assume to be partitioned into pairwise disjoint blocks
Ai, indexed by the agents i ∈ N . We denote the latter partition byA = {Ai | i ∈ N} and think of the block Ai ∈ A as the set
of transitions that are governed by the agent i. Intuitively, i can take the ‘‘action’’ (x → y) ∈ Ai and transform the current
state x of cooperation into the state y ∈ V .
Identifying a feasible transition (x → y) ∈ A with the corresponding pair xy ∈ V × V , we obtain G = (V , A) as the
(directed) transition graph of Γ with a vertex set V and an arc set A. For any x ∈ V , we set
x− = {u ∈ V | ux ∈ A} and x+ = {y ∈ V | xy ∈ A}.
x is an initial state (or a source) of G if x− = ∅ and a final state (or sink) if x+ = ∅. In the case x− ≠ ∅ ≠ x+, x is a transitory
state (or inner vertex). For simplicity of exposition, we assume throughout
(Γ0) There is one unique initial state s ∈ V .
(Γ1) G = (V , A) is acyclic (i.e., G does not contain any directed cycle).
By (Γ0) and (Γ1), every state of cooperation x ∈ V can be reached via a directed path from s to x in G. Moreover, each
path extends to a path that ends in a sink t . Let T be the collection of all sinks t . We denote by Pt the family of all paths
P = sx1 · · · xkt from the source s to the sink t ∈ T and thus obtain the family of all source–sink paths in G as
P =

t∈T
Pt .
Intuitively, the members of P correspond to the trajectories from the initial state s to final states t in the ‘‘cooperation
space’’.
The cooperation system Γ = (N,G,A) could be regarded as the extensive form of cooperation involving the agents in N ,
where the agents sequentially change the state of cooperation until a final state is reached. A trajectory P ∈ P is therefore
called a cooperation instance.
2.1. System states and entropy
We distinguish between the states of cooperation of Γ , i.e., the vertices of the graph G = (V , A), and the states of the
system Γ = (N,G,A). We take the cooperation instances of (i.e., the source–sink paths P) as the pure states of the system
Γ and define a (general)mixed state as a (formal) convex combination (superposition)
ρ =
−
P∈P
πPP

with πP ≥ 0 and
−
P∈P
πP = 1

(1)
of pure states. Interpreting the coefficient vector π = (πP | P ∈ P ) in (1) as a probability distribution on the collection
P of cooperation instances, it is convenient to identify the mixed state ρ with the corresponding probability distribution
π = π(ρ) on P .
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Terminology. For a clearer exposition, we will subsequently often refer to cooperation states x simply as ‘‘states’’ and to
system states ρ (indirectly) as ‘‘probability distributions’’ π = π(ρ).
2.1.1. Localized systems
Consider a fixed cooperation state x0 ∈ V and let V (x0) be the set of all x ∈ V that can be reached by directed paths from
x0. Then x0 is the source of the localized cooperation system
Γ (x0) = (N, V (x0), A(x0),A(x0)),
where A(x0) andA(x0) are the analogous restrictions of the arc set A and the partitionA.
Assume that Γ is in the system state ρ with probability distribution π = π(ρ). Let P be a path from x0 so some sink.
Denoting by Px0 the collection of all paths from the source s of Γ to x0, P is realized in Γ (x0)with probability
π0P =
−
P ′∈Px0
πP ′P ,
where P ′P is the concatenation of the paths P ′ and P at x0. So we find the localized system Γ (x0) to be in the well-defined
system state ρ0 with associated probability distribution π0 = π(ρ0).
2.1.2. Entropy
The entropy H(ρ) of the system state ρ of Γ is the parameter
0 ≤ H(ρ) = −
−
P∈P
πP(ρ) log2 πP(ρ) ≤ log2 |P |. (2)
H(ρ) = 0 is equivalent with ρ being a pure state. H(ρ) = log2 |P |means that all cooperation instances are equally likely
to be realized.
2.2. Flows and potentials
A flow in the cooperation system Γ is a (formal) linear combination
f =
−
xy∈A
fxy(x → y) (3)
of state transitions. For simplicity, we identify a flow with its coefficient vector, i.e., we set
f = (fxy | xy ∈ A) ∈ RA
and use the following notation for the flow into (resp. out of ) a state x ∈ V :
f −(x) =
−
u∈x−
fux and f +(x) =
−
y∈x+
fxy.
We say that f ∈ RA is an s-flow if f satisfies the conservation law
f −(x) = f +(x) for each transitory state x ∈ V . (4)
Let P = sx1 · · · xkt ∈ P be the trajectory that passes through the vertices s, x1, . . . , xk, t of G along the arcs
sx1, x1x2, . . . , xkt . We may think of P as the elementary flow f (P) ∈ RA with components
fxy(P) =

1 if xy ∈ P
0 otherwise.
It is clear that f (P) is an s-flow for every P ∈ P . In fact, the following is well known:
Lemma 2.1. f ∈ RA is an s-flow if and only if there are parameters fP ∈ R such that
f =
−
P∈P
fP f (P). 
A potential on Γ is a (formal) linear combination v of (cooperation) states, which we identify with a coefficient vector
in RV :
v =
−
x∈V
vxx ←→ v = (vx | x ∈ V ) ∈ RV . (5)
A constant potential v ≡ const is thought to produce no effect in the system Γ . So we consider two potentials v,w ∈ RV
to be equivalent if v − w ≡ const. This is conveniently expressed with the marginal operator (or boundary operator)
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∂ : RV → RA, where
∂xy(v) = v(y)− v(x) for all xy ∈ A,
associates with the potential v itsmarginal flow f = ∂(v).
Lemma 2.2. v,w ∈ RV are equivalent if and only if ∂(v) = ∂(w). 
Extending the marginal operator to arbitrary paths P = x0x1 · · · xk in the transition graph G = (V , A), we set
∂P(v) = ∂x0x1(v)+ · · · + ∂xk−1xk(v) = v(xk)− v(x0).
It follows that the potential v is uniquely determined by ∂(v) and its value v(s) on the initial state s ∈ V . Indeed, we have
v(x) = v(s)+ ∂P(v) for all paths P = s · · · x in G.
So wemay restrict our attention to zero-normalized potentials vwith values v(x) = v(x)−v(s) (and consequently v(s) = 0)
and henceforth use the term ‘‘potential’’ to mean ‘‘zero-normalized potential’’.
Given a flow f ∈ RA and a path P = x0x1 · · · xkx, we define the corresponding (discrete) path integral:∫
P
f = fx0x1 + · · · + fxk−1xk . (6)
Lemma 2.3. Let f ∈ RA be a flow. Then f = ∂(v) holds for some potential v if and only if for every sink t ∈ T and any two paths
P, P ′ ∈ Pt the path integrals coincide:∫
P
f =
∫
P ′
f .
By (6), v is uniquely determined by f . Hence the (|V | − 1)-dimensional vector space V ⊆ RV of zero-normalized potentials is
isomorphic with the vector space ∂(V) ⊆ RA of s-flows. 
Simple potentials. Relative to any x ∈ V , we define the simple potential ζx : V → R via
ζx(y) =

1 y lies on a path from s to x in G
0 otherwise.
The simple potentials form a basis of the vector space of all potentials:
Lemma 2.4. For every v ∈ V , there exist uniquely determined coefficients βx(v) such that
v =
−
x∈V
βx(v)ζx.
Proof. Consider the (0, 1)-matrix Z = [ζxy] ∈ {0, 1}V×V with coefficients ζxy = ζx(y). It is not hard to see that the column
and row indices x, y can be arranged so that Z is lower triangular with diagonal elements ζxx = 1. Hence Z has full rank |V |,
i.e., every potential v ∈ RV as a unique representation as a linear combination of the rows of Z . 
Notice that the coefficients βx(v) are linear in v:−
x∈V
βx(v + w)ζx = v + w =
−
x∈V
[βx(v)+ βx(w)]ζx−
x∈V
λβx(v)ζx = λv =
−
x∈V
βx(λv)ζx.
Moreover, if v is zero-normalized, we must have βs(v) = 0, i.e.,
v =
−
x≠s
βx(v)ζx. (7)
Remark. Lemma 2.4 can be viewed within the general framework of Rota’s [34] so-called incidence algebra. (See, e.g., [37]
for more details.)
3. Cooperative games
We now show how the models of classical cooperative games and their generalizations fit into the framework of
cooperation systems Γ = (N, V , A,A). Γ captures all the possible cooperation instances. The analysis of cooperation that
might (or should) take place, however, depends on further parameters. For example,
• an assessment (or valuation) by a real parameter v(x) ∈ R of the state x ∈ V of cooperation;
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• an assessment fxy ∈ Rwhich agent i ∈ N may have regarding the value of his action xy ∈ Ai and a corresponding reward
expectation;
• an assessmentπxy ∈ [0, 1] of the probability that (cooperation) state x is changed into state y in a randomized cooperation
instance.
We define a cooperative game to be a pair (Γ , v), where v : V → R is a valuation of the states of cooperation. v is
the so-called characteristic function of the game (Γ , v). By slight abuse of language, one sometimes refers to v itself as a
‘‘cooperative game’’. As usual, we make the assumption that characteristic functions v are zero-normalized in the sense
(ZN) v(s) = 0.
So the vector space V of all characteristic functions (relative to Γ ) coincides with the space of (zero-normalized) potentials
on Γ . Next, we present a generic set-theoretic model that incorporates all the classical cooperative games and their
generalizations in the literature relative to a set N of agents.
Selectors. A selector is an operator X → σ(X) on the subsets (a.k.a. coalitions) of N such that
σ(X) ⊆ N \ X for all X ⊆ N .
An ordered selection (a.k.a. ranking) is a sequence π = p1 . . . pk of agents with the property
pi ∈ σ({p1, . . . , pi−1}) (i = 1, . . . , k).
The underlying set S = {p1, . . . , pk} of the ranking π is a selection.
Let S be the collection of all selections. In accord with the terminology of combinatorial structure theory, we refer to a
selection B ∈ S with σ(B) = ∅ as a basis (of σ ).B denotes the collection of all bases.
Example 3.1. A greedoid (see [25]) is a pair (N, σ ), where σ is a selector so that for all selections S, S ′ ∈ S the so-called
Steinitz exchange property is guaranteed:
(G) |S| < |S ′| H⇒ σ(S) ∩ S ′ ≠ ∅.
Observe that all the generalizations of classical cooperative games investigated in [1,2,4,7,5,6,11,16,28,23,24] yield special
cases of greedoids. A regular set system in the sense of Lange and Grabisch [28] arises not necessarily from a greedoid, but
from a selector with the unique basis propertyB = {N}.
Remark. The concept of a selector is dual to that of a choice function, namely an operator X → γ (X) such that γ (X) ⊆ X
(see, e.g., [10,26,29]).
Cooperative games with selection structure. Associate with the selector σ the cooperation system Γ (σ ) with the selections
X ∈ S as cooperation states and the individual action sets
Ap = {(X, X ∪ p) | X ∈ S, p ∈ σ(X)} (p ∈ N).
So the empty set ∅ is the initial state of Γ (σ ) and the final states are precisely the σ -bases. Moreover, a path P from ∅ to
some X ∈ S in the transition graph G = (S, A) corresponds to a ranking π = p1, . . . , pk of the members of X .
The pair (Γ (σ ), v) is a cooperative game with coalition structure (N, σ ).
Example 3.2 (Full Cooperation). Let σ0 be the selector given by
σ0(X) = N \ X for all X ⊆ N .
The associated set S0 of selections comprises all subsets X ⊆ N . Hence we refer to Γ (σ0) as the full cooperation system. A
cooperative game of the type (Γ (σ0), v) is called classical and is specified by the (zero-normalized) function v : S0 → R. A
classical agent p ∈ N governs the action set
Ap = {(X, X ∪ p) | X ⊆ N \ p}.
Notice that all cooperative games with selector structure have the following singular action property
(SA) |P ∩ Ai| ≤ 1 holds for all cooperation instances P ∈ P , i.e., any agent i ∈ N acts at most once.
4. Allocations and values
Given the arbitrary cooperation system Γ = (N, V , A,A), we define an allocation mechanism to be a computational
scheme for allocating payoffs to the individual agents i ∈ N in the context of a cooperative game (Γ , v). We make the
following axiomatic assumptions:
(A0) The null game v ≡ 0 should yield zero payoffs.
(A1) The allocation to any agent i ∈ N should only depend on his action set Ai ∈ A and should be linear in v.
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(A0) and (A1) imply that equivalent potentials produce the same allocations. In other words, the allocation relative to the
potential v depends only on the marginal flow ∂(v). Since the vector space V of cooperative games is isomorphic to the
vector space ∂(V) of marginal flows, a linear allocation mechanism is therefore described by a parameter vector α ∈ RA
that determines the individual payoffs (or individual values)
ϕαi (v) =
−
xy∈Ai
αxy∂xy(v) =
−
xy∈Ai
αxy[v(y)− v(x)] (8)
for the agents i ∈ N . We call the linear functional
v → ϕα(v) = αT∂(v) =
−
xy∈A
αxy∂xy(v) =
−
i∈N
ϕαi (v) (9)
the (group) value associated with the allocation mechanism α.
4.1. Efficient allocations
Let α ∈ RA be an allocation mechanism. We say that α is efficient if the associated group value v → ϕα(v) enjoys the
following property:
(E) There are parameters µt ∈ R such that−
t∈T
µt = 1 and ϕα(v) =
−
t∈T
µtv(t) for all v ∈ V .
Example 4.1. A group value ϕ for classical cooperative games is called efficient if ϕ(v) = v(N) holds for all v. Since t = N
is the unique sink in the full cooperation system Γ (σ0), this notion agrees with our general definition.
Theorem 4.1. The allocation mechanism α ∈ RA is efficient if and only if α is an s-flow with the property α+(s) = 1.
Proof. Define the Dirac potential δx : V → {0, 1} for any x ≠ s by
δx(y) = 1⇐⇒ y = x.
Then we have v =∑x≠s v(x)δx for every v ∈ V . Moreover, any α ∈ RA yields
ϕα(δx) =
−
wz∈A
αwz[δx(z)− δx(w)] = α−(x)− α+(x).
If α is efficient, we have ϕα(δx) = 0 for every transitory state x and conclude that α must be an s-flow. Moreover, for the
potential δ =∑t∈T µtδt we find
1 =
−
t∈T
µt · 1 = ϕα(δ) =
−
t∈T
−
yt∈A
αyt =
−
sx∈A
αsx = α+(s).
Conversely, if α is an s-flow, we have by linearity
ϕα(v) = ϕα
−
x≠z
v(x)δx

=
−
t∈T
v(t)ϕα(δt).
Furthermore, we observe
α+(s) = 1 H⇒
−
t∈T
ϕα(δt) =
−
t∈T
α−(t) = α+(s) = 1.
So the claim of the theorem follows with µt = ϕα(δt). 
We now proceed to show that non-negative efficient allocation mechanisms correspond to system(!) states of Γ and
thus have a well-defined entropy.
4.2. Randomization
Let α ∈ RA be an efficient allocation mechanism with non-negative components αxy ≥ 0. We associate with α a random
walk on the transition graph G = (V , A) of the cooperation system Γ according to the following rules:
(R0) The walk starts in the initial state s.
(R1) The walk moves from the state x to the state y along the arc xy ∈ Awith probability πxy = αxy/α+(x) if x is not a final
state. If x is a final state, the random walk stops.
Notice that the randomwalk iswell-defined: a state x ≠ s can only be reached ifα−(x) > 0holds. But then alsoα+(x) > 0
is guaranteed if x is a transitory state. So the randomwalk stops eventually in some final state t ∈ T , having traversed some
source–sink path P ∈ P .
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Denote by Px the family of all paths from s to the state x and let π(Px) be the probability that the random walk follows
initially the path Px = s . . . x ∈ Px. Then the probabilities π(Px) can be recursively computed according to the rule
π(s . . . xy) =

0 if α+(x) = 0
π(s . . . x)πxy if α+(x) > 0.
The crucial observation is the following:
Lemma 4.1. Let α ∈ RA+ be a non-negative and efficient allocation mechanism. Then each component αxy of α equals the
probability Pr(x, y) that the random walk associated with α passes through the arc xy ∈ A.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume αxy > 0 for all xy ∈ A. Since the transition graph G is acyclic, we can
order the vertices x0, x1, . . . , xm of G such that we have for all indices 0 ≤ i, j ≤ m:
xixj ∈ A H⇒ i < j.
Since s is the unique source of G, we have x0 = s. In view of α+(s) = 1, the statement of the lemma is clearly true for all arcs
of the form x0y = sy. Assume now that Pr(u, z) = αuz has been established for all arcs uz with u = xi for some i ≤ k − 1
and consider the arc xky. Then one finds
Pr(xk, y) =
−
u∈x−k
Pr(u, xk)πxky
=
−
u∈x−k
αu,xkπxky
= α−(xk)πxky = α+(xk)πxky = αxky. 
Lemma 4.1 offers a stochastic interpretation of non-negative efficient linear values ϕα:
• Perform an α-random walk on G = (V , A) and allocate to the owner of the arc xy ∈ A the payoff ∂xy(v) = v(y)− v(x) if
the random walk passes through xy.
• The individual value ϕαi of agent i ∈ N is exactly his expected payoff total:
ϕαi (v) =
−
xy∈Ai
αxy∂xy(v).
Entropy and fair allocation. Theα-randomwalk according to (R0) and (R1) generates a probability distributionπ on the family
P of all cooperation instances.Moreover, Lemma4.1 shows thatα is uniquely determined byπ . Soα defines a unique system
state ρ(α). Hence it is meaningful to define the entropy H(α) of the non-negative efficient allocation mechanism α as
H(α) = H(ρ(α)) := −
−
P∈P
πP log2 πP . (10)
The notion of entropy suggests to regard a proposed allocation mechanism α as fair if
H(α) = H(ρ)
is true, where ρ is the presumed system state of Γ .
Remark. Note that the entropy H(α) refers to a particular allocation mechanism α for the system Γ and not a particular
game (Γ , v). For an entropy notion for set functions v, see [22].
4.3. Random values
We now assume an arbitrary probability distribution π on the cooperation instances P ∈ P to be given. π induces an
allocation mechanism α ∈ RA via
αxy =
−
P∋xy
πP .
The group value v → ϕα(v) is called the random value induced by π .
Lemma 4.2. The allocation mechanism α induced by the probability distribution π on P is non-negative and efficient.
Proof. αxy ≥ 0 follows from πP ≥ 0 for all P ∈ P . α−(x) = α+(x) for all transitory states x is a consequence of the fact that
a random path enters x and leaves xwith the same probability. Finally, one observes
α+(s) =
−
x∈s+
−
P∋sx
πP =
−
P∈P
πP = 1. 
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From Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 we infer:
Theorem 4.2. The class of non-negative efficient allocation mechanisms relative to the cooperation system Γ = (N, V , A,A)
corresponds to the class of system states of Γ . 
4.4. Shapley allocations
We assume to be given non-negative parameters µt ≥ 0 such that∑t∈T µt = 1 (i.e. a probability distribution µ on the
set T of final states) and consider the linear functional
v → ϕ(v) =
−
t∈T
µtv(t)
on the vector spaceV of (zero-normalized) potentials. We seek a non-negative efficient allocation mechanism α ∈ RA with
the property ϕ = ϕα . Such a mechanism is easily obtained. We define a probability distribution π S on P via
π SP =
µt
|Pt | if P ∈ Pt
and let αS be the associated mechanism. We call αS the Shapley allocation mechanism relative toµ = {µt | t ∈ T }. Then one
finds
Theorem 4.3. The Shapley allocationmechanism αS is the unique non-negative and efficient allocationmechanism α of maximal
entropy relative to the property ϕα = ϕ. 
4.4.1. Shapley values
We letΦµ be the group value induced by the Shapley allocationmechanism aS above and call it the Shapley value (relative
to the parameter set µ).
In the full cooperation system Γ (σ0), the so-called grand coalition N is the unique final state. So v → v(N) corresponds
to a linear functional ϕ with µ = {1}. In this case, the Shapley mechanism αS yields exactly the classical allocation scheme
introduced by Shapley [35], which has become known as the Shapley valueΦ = Φ{1}.
A similar situation occurs in any cooperation system Γ (σ ) arising from a selector σ with the unique basis N . Here, our
Shapley value yields the Kirchhoff Shapley value of Lange and Grabisch [28]. The ‘‘Shapley value’’ of Faigle and Kern [16] for
precedence orders corresponds to the Shapley mechanism of the associated ranking structure.
The ‘‘Shapley value’’ for cooperative games on a matroid with collection B of bases proposed by Bilbao et al. [4] is the
Shapley valueΦµ relative to the linear functional
ϕ(v) =
−
B∈B
µBv(B) with µB ≥ 0,
−
B∈B
µB = 1.
4.4.2. Myerson and position value
The Myerson value discussed in [1] for a generalization of Myerson’s [31] communication games is the Shapley value
applied to a special class of classical cooperative games. The position value proposed in Borm et al. [8] for Myerson games
also arises essentially from the Shapley value. The underlying model, however, is more general:
One starts from a partition N = N1∪ · · ·∪Nm of the agents into pairwise disjoint and non-empty groups Ni and thinks of
the Ni asm individually acting ‘‘players’’. The cooperative game is assumed to be defined relative to N . However, one seeks
to divide the value v(N) not among the |N| agents but among them players Ni. The position value now computes the Shapley
value relative to N and then assigns to Ni the sum of the Shapley allocations of the agents in Ni. The latter model amounts
to the choice
Ai = {(X, X ∪ p) | p ∈ Ni \ X}
as the arc set owned by Ni. So the position value is a special case of the general Shapley allocation mechanism.
4.5. λ-Mechanisms
A parameter vector λ ∈ RN with positive components λi > 0 defines a randomwalk on the transition graph G that starts
with the initial state s and chooses a successor of the current state x according to the rule
(L0) Assign weight λxy = λi to the arcs xy ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N .
(L1) Move from x to ywith probability πxy = λxy/λ+(x).
We denote the induced allocation mechanism by αλ and the associated group value by Ψ λ. Ψ λ is the so-called λ-value.
Assume that the transition graph G = (V , A) is regular in the sense that V can be partitioned into V = V0 ∪ V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vk
such that
(V0) If xy is an arc with x ∈ Vj, then y ∈ Vj+1.
(V1) All vertices x in a block Vj have the same outdegree∆+(x).
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Then one obtains the Shapley value as a special λ-value:
Proposition 4.1. If G is regular, thenΦ{1} = Ψ (1,...,1). 
Remark. It is not difficult to see that the conclusion of Proposition 4.1 may be false if G is not regular.
4.5.1. The weighted Shapley value
Assume the set N = N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nm of agents partitioned into the pairwise disjoint and non-empty blocks Nj. For each
X ⊆ N , let j(X) be the largest index j such that X ∩ Nj ≠ ∅ and consider the system Γ (σ )with
σ(X) =
Nj(X) \ X if Nj(X) \ X ≠ ∅,
∅ if j(X) = m,
Nj(X)+1 otherwise.
Γ (σ ) has a regular transition graph G(σ ). Moreover, the associated λ-value Ψ λ is precisely the λ-weighted Shapley value
of Kalai and Samet [24]. In the case of the trivial partition N = N1 with just one block, we obtain the classical model of
cooperative games. In particular, Ψ λ becomes the generalized value of Shapley [36].
Example 4.2. Let S ⊆ N be a fixed non-empty set of agents in the Kalai–Samet model and consider the cooperative game
with potential
vS(X) =

1 if X ∩ S ≠ ∅
0 otherwise.
Let j0 be the minimal index j such that S ∩ Nj ≠ ∅ and set Smin := S ∩ Nj0 . Given λ > 0, a random cooperation instance will
assign the marginal value 1 to the first agent of S becoming active. This is necessarily an agent in Smin. The probability for
i ∈ Smin to be the first selected is
Ψ λi (vS) =
λi∑
ℓ∈Smin
λℓ
. (11)
In other words: Ψ λ distributes the value vS(N) = 1 among the i ∈ Smin in proportion to their respective weight λi.
4.6. Monotone potentials and symmetries
We say that the potential v of Γ = (N, V , A,A) ismonotone (increasing) if for all x, y ∈ V ,
xy ∈ A H⇒ v(x) ≤ v(y).
In order to characterize monotone potentials by non-negative individual payoffs, we assume Γ to have the singular action
property
(SA) |P ∩ Ai| ≤ 1 for all P ∈ P and i ∈ N .
Recall from Section 3 that all cooperative games with selector structure enjoy property (SA), for example.
Theorem 4.4. Assume that (SA) holds for Γ . Then a potential v is monotone if and only if every λ-value Ψ λ yields non-negative
individual payoffs
Ψ λi (v) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
Proof. Since random allocation mechanisms are non-negative, a monotone potential v will guarantee non-negative
individual payoffs ϕαi (v) ≥ 0 for any random value ϕα and hence for λ-values in particular.
Conversely, suppose that v(x) < v(y) holds for some arc xy ∈ Ak. Choose a path P = x0x1 · · · xm ∈ P that passes through
xy and assume xi−1xi ∈ Ai for i = 1, . . . ,m and xy = xk−1xk in particular. Consider a positive parameter vector λ ∈ RN with
steeply decreasing components
λ1 ≫ · · · ≫ λk ≫ · · · ≫ λm ≫ · · · ≫ λ|N| > 0.
λwill generate a random walk that follows P with probability π(P) ≈ 1. The λ-value Ψ λ therefore yields
Ψ λk (v) ≈ v(xk)− v(xk−1) = v(y)− v(x) < 0. 
A symmetry of Γ is a bijection σ : V → V of the vertices of the transition graph G = (V , A) such that for all x, y ∈ V and
i ∈ N ,
(S0) σ (xy) := σ(x)σ (y) ∈ A ⇐⇒ xy ∈ A;
(S1) σ (Ai) = Aj for some j ∈ N .
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By (S0), a symmetry σ induces a permutation on the set P of cooperation instances. So σ acts on the set of probability
distributions π on P (or system states of Γ ) via
π → πσ with πσ (P) = π(σ(P)).
σ also acts on the game potentials v ∈ RV via
v → vσ ∈ RV with vσ (x) = v(σ (x))
in a natural way since σ(s) = s always holds as a consequence of (S0). For ease of notation, we will also write πσ = σ(π).
By (S1), σ induces a permutation on the set N of agents:
i → σ(i) = j where Aj = σ(Ai).
Lemma 4.3. Let απ ∈ RA be the allocation mechanism induced by the probability distribution π on P with associated group
value ϕπ . Then every symmetry σ satisfies the identity
ϕπi (v
σ ) = ϕσ(π)σ (i) (v) for all i ∈ N.
Proof. The probability that xy ∈ A occurs in a π-random walk equals the probability that σ(xy) occurs in a σ(π)-random
walk. Hence we conclude for every i ∈ N ,
ϕ
σ(π)
σ (i) (v) =
−
xy∈σ(Ai)
ασ(π)xy [v(y)− v(x)]
=
−
xy∈Ai
α
σ(π)
σ (xy)[v(σ (y))− v(σ (x))]
=
−
xy∈Ai
απx,y[vσ (y)− vσ (x)]
= ϕπi (vσ ). 
A symmetry of a game (Γ , v) is a symmetry σ of Γ that leaves v invariant:
vσ (x) = v(x) for all x ∈ V .
Carreras and Owen [9] have characterized the symmetries of a classical game v as those symmetries of Γ (σ0) that are
compatible with arbitrary λ-mechanisms. In order to generalize their result to our present model (Theorem 4.5), we assume
(SA) as before.
Lemma 4.4. Assuming (SA), let v ∈ RN be an arbitrary game potential. Then either v = 0 or there exists some λ ∈ RN with
components λi > 0 such that the associated λ-mechanism αλ yields a nontrivial group value, i.e.,
Ψ λi (v) ≠ 0 for some i ∈ N.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that v is not the null potential. So there exists some P = x0x1 · · · xm ∈ P with
v(xk) ≠ 0 but v(xk−1) = 0 for some k ≥ 1. Assume furthermore xi−1xi ∈ Ai for all i = 1, . . . ,m. As in the proof of
Theorem 4.4 we choose the parameter vector λ ∈ RN so that
λ1 ≫ · · · ≫ λk ≫ · · · ≫ λm ≫ · · · ≫ λ|N| > 0.
Then the random walk induced by λwill follow P with probability≈ 1 and we find
Ψ λk (v) ≈ v(xk)− v(xk−1) = v(xk) ≠ 0. 
Theorem 4.5. Assuming (SA), let v ∈ RV be an arbitrary potential. Then a symmetry σ of Γ is a symmetry of v if and only if
Ψ λi (v) = Ψ σ(λ)σ (i) (v)
holds for all strictly positive λ ∈ RN and i ∈ N.
Proof. If σ is a symmetry, i.e., if v = vσ , then the condition is satisfied (Lemma 4.3). In the case v ≠ vσ , on the other hand,
i.e., ifw = v − vσ ≠ 0, Lemma 4.4 guarantees some λ and some i such that
0 ≠ Ψ λi (w) = Ψ λi (v)− Ψ σ(λ)σ (i) (v)
violates the condition. 
Remark. The statement of Theorem 4.5 may be false if assumption (SA) is dropped.
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5. Cooperation and interaction
We turn to the question how cooperation and interaction of agents is assessed if Γ = (N, V , A,A) is in a certain system
state ρ, represented by the probability distribution π = π(ρ) on the collectionP of all cooperation instances. Our system-
theoretic model will provide a theory of local cooperation (Theorem 5.1). Moreover, a systematic theory for the so-called
interaction indices will be established.
5.1. Local cooperation
Assume that the cooperation state x0 ∈ V is observed. Then we are presented with the localized system
Γ (x0) = (N, V (x0), A(x0),A(x0))
being in the system state ρ0. Let π0 = π(ρ0) be the associated probability distribution on the cooperation instances of
Γ (x0) (see Section 2.1).
Any Γ -potential v ∈ V implies via its marginal flow ∂(v) a Γ (x0)-potential
v0(x) := v(x)− v(x0) for all x ∈ V (x0).
Denoting by ϕπ (v|x0) := ϕπ0(v0) the associated random value, one might suspect that ϕπ (v|x0) results from local
cooperation values κπx (v) that are implicitly present at the various cooperation states x ∈ V . It turns out that these
cooperation values indeed exist and operate linearly on the potential space V .
Theorem 5.1. For every probability distributionπ on the cooperation instances of Γ = (N, V , A,A) and every potential v ∈ V ,
there exist unique linear values v → κπx (v) ∈ R such that
ϕπ (v|x0) =
−
x∈V (x0)
κπx (v) for all x0 ∈ V .
Proof. With any v ∈ V , we associate the potential x → v(x) = ϕπ (v|x) and recall from Section 2.2 the representation
v(x0) =
−
x∈V
βx(v)ζx(x0) =
−
x∈V (x0)
βx(v)
in terms of simple potentials. Since v → ϕπ (v|x) is linear, the operators v → κπx (v) = βx(v) are linear for every x ∈ V and
have the desired properties. 
5.2. Interaction
Interaction among agents in a cooperation system Γ = (N, V , A,A) is assessed in a way similar to our analysis of local
cooperation.We furthermore allowN to be partially ordered by some precedence relation (N,≼), where i ≼ j indicates that
i ‘‘dominates’’ j. A (feasible) alliance is a set F ⊆ N that respects dominance, i.e., is such that for all i ∈ F and j ∈ N ,
i ≼ j H⇒ j ∈ F .
F denotes the family of all alliances. Given the cooperation state x0 ∈ V and the alliance F ∈ F , we let P 0(F) be the
collection of all maximal (i.e., non-extendible) paths P = x0x1 . . . xk with the property that every arc xi−1xi of P is governed
by some member of F . For each such path P and potential v, recall the notation
∂P(v) = v(xk)− v(x0).
Letπ be a probability distribution on the familyP of all cooperation instances.π induces a probability distributionπ0(F)
on P 0(F)with expected potential value
∂πF (v|x0) =
−
P∈P 0(F)
π0P (F)∂P(v).
Example 5.1. Let Γ (σ0) be the full cooperation system. Then ∂P(v) = v(X0 ∪ F) − v(X0) holds for all P ∈ P 0(F) and
therefore
∂πF (v|X0) = v(X0 ∪ F)− v(X0).
Setting F (G) = {F ∈ F | F ⊆ G}, we find:
Theorem 5.2. Let (N,≼) be a dominance order, x0 ∈ V a cooperation state and v a potential of Γ = (N, V , A,A). Then there
exist unique linear values v → ∆πF (v|x0) such that for every alliance G ∈ F ,
∂πG (v|x0) =
−
F∈F (G)
∆πF (v|x0).
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Proof. In analogy with the proof of Lemma 2.4, we define the matrix Z = [ζFG] ∈ {0, 1}F×F relative to the alliance system
F with coefficients
ζFG = 1⇐⇒ F ⊆ G.
The matrix Z is invertible. Hence the claim of the theorem may be deduced with a reasoning similar to the proof of
Theorem 5.1. 
5.2.1. Interaction values
The linear operator v → ∆πF (v|x0) is called the local interaction value of the alliance F ∈ F in the cooperation state
x0 ∈ V .
Example 5.2. Let Γ (σ0) be the full cooperation system and assume N trivially ordered. So every subset F ⊆ N is a feasible
alliance. Fix X0 ⊆ N and two agents i, j ∈ N \ X0. Then we find
∂i(v|X0) = v(X0 ∪ i)− v(X0)
∂ij(v|X0) = v(X0 ∪ {i, j})− v(X0)
and obtain
∆πij (v|X0) = v(X0 ∪ {i, j})− v(X0 ∪ i)− v(X0 ∪ j)+ v(X0),
which yields Owen’s [33] local interaction value. Its generalization to arbitrary subsets F ⊆ N is due to Grabisch and
Roubens [21].
5.2.2. Interaction indices
Given the local interaction values v → ∆πF (v|x), we call their weighted sum
v → IF (v) =
−
x∈V
βF (x)∆πF (v|x)
relative to a given parameter vectorβF ∈ RV an interaction index for the alliance F ∈ F . Note that also interaction indices are
linear values on the cooperation system and may hence be studied within the framework of the previous sections (cf. [19]
for the classical full cooperation model).
Example 5.3. Let Γ (σ0) be the full classical cooperation system. For any X ⊆ N and i ∈ N , we obtain the local cooperation
value v(X ∪ i)− v(X). The choice
βi(X) = 1|N| − |X |
 |N|
|X |
−1
yields the interaction index
Ii(v) =
−
X⊆N\i
1
|N|
 |N| − 1
|X |
−1
[v(X ∪ i)− v(X)],
which equals the individual value of Shapley [35].
Example 5.4. Consider Γ (σ0). Fix i, j ∈ N, X ⊆ N and obtain the local interaction value
∆i,j(v|X) = v(X ∪ {i, j})− v(X ∪ i)− v(X ∪ j)+ v(X).
The interaction index resulting from the choice
βi,j(X) = (|N| − 1)−1
 |N| − 2
|X |
−1
is Owen’s [33] so-called co-value:
Ii,j(v) =
−
X⊆N\{i,j}
βi,j(X)∆i,j(v|X).
6. Core and Weber sets
For our discussion of cores and Weber sets, we restrict ourselves to cooperation systems Γ = Γ (σ ) that arise from
selection structures (N, σ ). So each state of Γ corresponds to a selection S ⊆ N of agents and we define the set of essential
members,
γ (S) = {i ∈ S | S \ i ∈ S},
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as consisting of those agents that could threaten to leave S in a feasible way. Given a potential v : S → R on the family of
selections, we define the open core as the non-negative polyhedron
coreo(v) = {z ∈ RN+ | z(γ (S)) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ S}, (12)
where we employ the usual shorthand notation z(X) =∑i∈X zi. The set coreo(v) is always non-empty. The parameter
v∗ = min{z(N) | z ∈ coreo(v)} ≥ 0
is the minimal total allocation to the set N that would allow us to satisfy the restrictions of (12). So we define the core as the
(non-empty) polytope
core∗(v) = {z ∈ coreo(v) | z(N) = v∗} ⊆ RN+.
Remark. In the case of full cooperation, core∗(v) coincideswith the classical core if the latter exists (see Section 6.2.1 below).
In the case of ordered cooperative games, it corresponds to the core as studied in [17]. It appears natural to apply this
definition also to games on convex geometries, where the essential members of a coalition are its ‘‘extreme points’’. Note,
however, that Bilbao et al. [7] define a different notion of ‘‘core’’ for convex geometries.
6.1. Weber sets
Let B be a σ -basis (and hence a sink in the transition graph) and consider the source–sink path P ∈ PB:
P : ∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sn−1 ⊂ Sn = B.
Fix a potential v and assume that the indices have been chosen so that i ∈ γ (Si) holds for i = 1, . . . , n. Define the upper
triangular (n× n)-incidence matrixM = M(P)with coefficients
mij =

1 if i ∈ γ (Sj)
0 otherwise.
M is of full rank n and invertible. So there is a unique vector hP such that−
j∈γ (Si)
hPi = v(Si) (i = 1, . . . , n).
We extend hP to all of N via hPj = 0 for j ∈ N \ Sn and call hP amarginal vector. We define theWeber set relative to the basis
B as the convex hull of all marginal vectors:
WB(v) = conv{hP ∈ RN | P ∈ PB}.
6.2. Greedy paths and potentials
Let now c ∈ RN be an arbitrary parameter vector. We construct a greedy path P and a greedy potential y recursively from
a basis of (N, σ ) towards the empty set as follows.
(G0) Choose some basis B ∈ S and initialize:
P ← B; y(S)← 0 for all S ∈ S; X ← B;
(G1) If X = ∅, output (P, y) and stop.
(G2) If X ≠ ∅, choose i ∈ γ (X) of minimal weight ci;
Update: y(X)← ci; cj ← [cj − ci] for all j ∈ γ (X); P ← XP;
(G3) Update X ← [X \ i] and goto (G1).
Lemma 6.1. Let P = ∅S1 · · · Sn be the path with potential y ∈ RV constructed by the greedy algorithm relative to the non-
negative parameter vector c ∈ RN+. Assume furthermore that the agents are labeled so that i ∈ γ (Si) holds. Then y(S) ≥ 0 holds
for all S ∈ S and, in particular, y(S) = 0 for all S ∉ P. Moreover, y satisfies the linear constraints−
γ (S)∋i
y(S)
=ci for all i = 1, . . . , n
≤ci otherwise.
Proof. The greedy algorithm chooses agent n ∈ γ (Sn) ofminimal weight. This choice implies y(Sn) = cn ≥ 0 and cj−cn ≥ 0
for all j ∈ γ (Sn), i.e., the updated c-values remain non-negative for all the agents. Hence also y(Sn−1) ≥ 0 is guaranteed,
which yields y(S) ≥ 0 for all selections S ∈ S.
The weight ci of agent i changes in an update only if i ∈ γ (X) holds for the current X . Moreover, the weight is never
increased. Hence we find equality to hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
ci =
−
{y(Sj) | j ≥ i, i ∈ γ (Sj)} =
−
γ (S)∋i
y(S).
Inequality follows the same way. 
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Lemma 6.2. Let (P, y) be the output of the greedy algorithm relative to the weight vector c ∈ RN+. Then the associated marginal
vector h = hP satisfies−
j∈N
cjhj =
−
S∈P
v(S)y(S) =
−
S∈S
v(S)y(S).
Proof. LetM = M(P) be the incidence matrix of P . Then we have hTM = vT (restricted to the selections S ∈ P) andMy = c
(Lemma 6.1) and therefore
cTh = yTMTh = yTv. 
Theorem 6.1. Let B be a basis in Γ (σ ) and v ≥ 0 an arbitrary potential of Γ (σ ). Then the following holds.
(a) If hP(N) < v∗ holds for all P ∈ PB, then core∗(v) ∩WB(v) = ∅.
(b) If hP(N) ≥ v∗ holds for all P ∈ PB, then core∗(v) ⊆ WB(v).
Proof. Assume z ∈ core∗(v)∩WB(v) exists. Since z is a convex combination of marginal vectors, there must be at least one
marginal vector hwith h(N) ≥ z(N) = z∗, which proves (a).
Suppose now that claim (b) of the theorem is false and a vector z ∈ core∗(v) \ WB(v) exists. Since WB(v) is a closed
convex set, there is a hyperplane separating z fromWB(v), i.e., there is a parameter vector c ∈ RN so that−
j∈N
cjzj <
−
j∈N
cjhPj for all paths P ∈ PB.
Because of 0 ≤ z(N) = v∗ ≤ hP(N), we may assume c ≥ 0 w.l.o.g. (Otherwise, we add a large enough constant C > 0 to
each component of c without affecting the inequality.) Run the greedy algorithm with respect to c and obtain the greedy
path P ∈ PB, greedy potential y and the marginal vector hP .
Because of c, y, z ≥ 0, we deduce from Lemma 6.1 the inequalities−
j∈N
cjzj ≥
−
j∈N
−
γ (S)∋j
y(S)

zj =
−
S∈S
−
j∈γ (S)
y(S)zj
≥
−
S∈S
y(S)v(S) =
−
j∈N
cjhPj ,
where the last equality follows from Lemma 6.2. This contradiction establishes the theorem. 
Corollary 6.1. Let B be a basis and v a potential of Γ (σ ). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) core∗(v) = WB(v).
(ii) hP ∈ core∗(v) for all P ∈ PB.
Proof. (ii) obviously follows from (i). Conversely, if (ii) holds, then hP(N) = v∗ is true. So statement (b) of Theorem 6.1
yields
core∗(v) ⊆ WB(v) ⊆ core∗(v)
since core∗(v) is a convex set. 
6.2.1. The classical core
Consider the full cooperation system Γ (σ0) with σ0(X) = N \ X and hence γ (X) = X for all X ⊆ N . The classical
core model attempts to distribute the value v(N) relative to a game potential v among the members of N and therefore
investigates the non-negative polytope
core(v) = {z ∈ RN+ | z(N) = v(N), z(X) ≥ v(X) ∀X ⊆ N}. (13)
In view of v∗ ≥ v(N), it is clear that the polytope core(v) can only be non-empty if v∗ = v(N) is guaranteed. So we deduce
from Theorem 6.1:
Corollary 6.2 ([38]). For the full cooperation system Γ (σ0), one has
core(v) ⊆ WN(v) for every game potential v.
Proof. If v(N) < v∗, then core(v) = ∅ ⊆ WN(c) is trivially true. 
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